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In times of neoliberalism, it is healthy hearing the Prime Minister Xavier Bettel
of Luxembourg say that “the protection of health and life takes precedence over
economic interests”. But this declaration came in the context of the recourse to
extraordinary emergency powers, on the day before the Government declared the
“state of crisis” to face the Coronavirus situation. In Luxembourg, this tool to regulate
emergencies has progressively found its path into the Constitution while elsewhere
in Europe philosophers like Agamben or public law professors (like Paul Cassia or
Olivier Beaud) argued that a constitutional state of emergency entails the paradox of
“constitutionalising the absence of constitution”. It is therefore important to reflect on
the effects of the conjugation of these two discourses into the sanitary crisis and their
effect on democracy and human rights protection.
A Historical Crescendo of Emergency Powers
The legal tool providing for the state of emergency in Luxembourg has a long
history, as the sociologist Renée Wagener clarified. Already in 1915, the Law on
State of Emergency (Noutstandsgesetz) authorized the Government to take urgent
measures without parliamentary procedure, with the only duty to inform the Chamber
of deputies. This particular procedure led to the adoption of 618 measures before
1935, 274 of which concerned measures taken during the war (mostly to ensure
supply). The perimeter of the emergency powers kept expanding between 1935 and
1939. With the up-coming war, their temporal limitation was suspended so that the
Government could postpone elections during the war. The sociologist saw in the
normalization of this culture of emergency, with very few criticisms against it, one of
the fundamental factors for the limitation of the effectiveness of parliamentarianism,
the aborted attempts to generalize some voting rights beyond nationality and the
strengthening of the conditions to obtain the Luxembourgish nationality.
A second movement in the legal sedimentation of emergency powers under
Luxembourg law deals with its progressive constitutionalization. In 2004, as
a reaction to the anguishes of 9/11 and without real political attention, it was
decided to introduce an emergency regime in the Constitution. This regime had
evolved progressively after the Second World War: a law enabling the Government
was needed (Habilitatiounsgesetz), it had to be renewed every year (even if the
parliamentary practice ritualised this renewal at every session of December with
reduced attention paid to it) and its scope of application was generally limited to
international crises and monetary issues. This practice translated into constitutional
terms in the revised Article 32 of the Fundamental Law of the Grand Duchy
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(originally dating of 1868), establishing an état de crise the scope of application of
which was indeed limited to international crises and allowed the executive to take
urgent measures, derogating from in force legal provisions, in all matters and the
validity of which was limited to three months.
As a reaction to the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, the president of
the Luxembourg socialist parliamentary group Alex Bodry introduced a revision
proposal to expand the scope of this constitutional provision, which resulted in the
current Article 32(4). Few voiced their preoccupation against the generalisation of a
discourse according to which security needed to be stronger for (or at the expenses
of) liberty. Among political parties, Déi Lénk denounced that a parliamentary
Chamber that was constantly struggling to update an archaic constitutional charter
was now going to pass such reform without even reflecting twice on its dangers.
The Council of State, which after the Procola case before the ECtHR has only
advisory functions, has also been very critical of the text: the proposal conveyed the
“erroneous signal according to which the traditional rules of the État de droit were
not enough to maintain public order and risked to convey the feeling of passing from
an imperative of civil liberties and fundamental rights protection to the safeguard
of public security” (p. 9). The preoccupations were all the more justified in light of
the tendency of the political discourse to enlarge ad libitum the field of application
of what had to be considered a crisis. While Alex Bodry had suggested to use the
tool to address the ongoing migration crisis, Article 32(4) was used during the 2008
financial crisis to save the Dexia bank.
Now the text codified a certain enlargement of the notion, allowing for declaring
a state of crisis in case of “international crisis, real threats for the vital interests of
the whole or one part of the population or imminent danger resulting from serious
harm caused to public security”. There are some constitutional boundaries to the
possibilities of action of the executive power. Indeed, according to the text, the
urgent measures must be “necessary, adequate and proportionate to their objective”,
they should respect the Constitution and international treaties (that, interestingly
enough, have a supra-constitutional status in the Luxembourg legal order), and
must be limited in time (ten days, renewable for 3 months with prior authorisation
of Parliament). Moreover, the Constitution foresees a general sunset clause: all
measures taken on the ground of Article 32(4) would cease to have effect at the
end of the state of crisis. According to Luc Heuschling, those boundaries would
nevertheless be fundamental as they can be invoked before a judge. No judicial
decision in this respect is so far to be found in the database of the Ministry of Justice.
With this deafening political silence in the background, the strongest criticisms came
from civil society. Frank Wies addressed the problematic reflex to transpose to
the Luxembourgish context French measures, without questioning if less intrusive
measures for the democratic spectrum did not already exist. Véronique Bruck,
who had strongly advocated for the need to strengthen the Constitution in terms of
fundamental rights notably by introducing a pro homine clause, lamented eloquently
the introduction of an exogenous transplant to the anatomy of the Constitution,
with illusory guarantees and a serious impact for the most vulnerable, calling for a
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suppression of Article 32(4). But here we are: Luxembourg is facing the Coronavirus
crisis with this powerful constitutional tool.
The Legal Morphology of the State of Crisis
The legal architecture of the Luxembourg reaction to the Coronavirus crisis is,
at least, threefold. First, needing to act rapidly, the Minister of Health Paulette
Lenert adopted a decree (arrêté ministériel) on 16 March 2020 restricting the
freedom of movement, closing public establishments, all commercial activities
and organising communications with hospitals and essential services. The most
interesting concerning this decree is its legal basis: the Minister had recourse to
the Law of 25 March 1885 "on measures against the introduction and spread of
contagious diseases", Article 1 of which allows the member of the government in
charge of public health to take all necessary measures to prevent the spread of a
pandemic. The law was used 35 times since: against cholera in the 19th century,
rabies in the 1960s, as well as swine flu in 2009 when it was the legal basis to create
treatment centres to support the overwhelmed hospitals.
Second, according to Alex Bodry, the father of the current physiognomy of Article
32(4), the state of crisis was a needed legal follow-up for more “legal certainty”.
Indeed, the executive activated the state of crises under Article 32(4) of the
Constitution with the Grand Duke’s Regulation of 18 March 2020, replicating and
expanding on the previous decree. Following the text of the Constitution, it is the
Grand Duke who declares the crisis situation: this is only one of the examples of the
“ambiguities” of the constitutional language according to Luc Heuschling, as in reality
it is the Government that exercises the executive power alone in case of crisis.
Third step, after the ten days’ delay, it is the Parliament that needs to extend the
state of crisis, as per the third sentence of Article 32(4). The Law of 24 March 2020
operated this prolongation in a very automatic way with two articles: the first declared
the extension of the Grand Duke’s Regulation for three months and the second the
immediate entry into force from the publication. Equally laconic is the avis of the
Conseil d’État, considering that the length of the extension pertains to the exclusive
appreciation of the Chamber. The Parliament followed the proposal of the socialist
rapporteur Mars di Bartolomeo who defended the necessity for a maximal extension
of 3 months as an answer to the “most serious crisis that occurred in Luxembourg
since the Second World War”.
Institutions like the judiciary, have generally kept functioning but with a highly
reduced service. A Grand Duke’s regulation of 25 March suspending procedural
time limits set the principle according to which hearings were re-scheduled, apart
for few cases that are strictly enumerated; its somewhat confused and sibylline
provisions had to be clarified subsequently on April 1st. Restrictive measures have
been adopted notably concerning all visits to the penitentiary centre, while the ADR
party considered that less restrictive solutions were conceivable. As for now, no
judicial decisions have directly addressed the pandemic. In a pending case before
the Administrative Court of Appeal, a migrant held in prison for his illegal situation
in Luxembourg invoked the COVID-19 situation as a reason for the impossibility of
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his return to Tunisia and asked on this basis to be set free. The appellate judges will
have to take into account the COVID-19 situation, as a fact, in their proportionality
review of the necessity of detention.
Risks and Criticisms
If we read the current sanitary crisis in the light of the debates concerning the
constitutionalisation of the state of crisis, several points stand out for reflection. On
17 April 2020, the Luxemburger Wort has collected a series of articles focusing on
the way the opposition analysed the Government’s Coronavirus politics. The different
parties supported the action of the government and it is a common opinion that the
reaction of the Ministry of Health was laudable and effective. Nevertheless, some
doubts remained open.
Contrary to the ongoing debates in France where “carence” seems to be the
“essential grammar to think the relations between the responsibility of the public
power and the sanitary crisis” (S. Hennette-Vauchez), the lack of reactivity plays
a minor role in Luxembourg. Only David Wagner (Déi Lénk) stressed that the first
parliamentary questions arose as early as February. The core of the criticisms dealt
more with a pure political responsibility than with an administrative law one. At the
heart of the discussions lies the lack of clarity.
The lack of clarity would concern above all the exit-strategy, concerning the
distribution of masks and the use of tests for the population. This first point was
recently addressed in an urgent parliamentary question of the Pirate party, pointing
out that masks have been sent directly to residents at their address in Luxembourg
but what about homeless people? Moreover, this exit-strategy would suffer from
problems coming from inequalities. It is not clear why big hardware stores can now
re-open and smaller businesses cannot seize the same opportunity. Similarly, risks
of inequalities are particularly intense for the situation of distance learning
Nevertheless, the core of the worries concerned the situation of the most vulnerable
individuals during the crisis. As of the end of March, the president of the Commission
consultative des droits de l’Homme wrote an open letter to the Prime Minister to
show support in relation to the measures taken. While the right to life is an essential
preoccupation for the Government, the heart of his reflection lies on the injustices
that can emerge for the marginalised.
The impact of the state of emergency is stronger at the margins of society and the
governmental action has to take into serious account its relation to solidarity. As
David Wagner pointed out, it is certainly not enough to hide behind a rhetoric of
solidarity not to face the serious burdens of the sanitary system or the difficulties of
the housing situation in Luxembourg. What is more, extended powers risk having as
side effect discouraging solidarity, as it was the case for the NGO Stroossenengelen
(Angels of the streets) that has been helping homeless people all over Luxembourg.
On 29 March, the police have applied fines of 145 euros to the volunteers for non-
respecting the rules on containment and social distancing. The Minister of Family
suggested the NGO to stop its activities as the Government has allegedly put in
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place its best efforts to help the homeless with means that are necessarily more
important.
What is more difficult to evaluate for now is the impact that the state of crisis
measures will have on the future. The culture of emergency can extend far beyond
the three months of the constitutional sunset clause. A worrying example is the
recent measures allowing increasing the working time from 48 hours per week to
a maximum of 60 hours, without a serious agreement with trade unions. We can
only but agree with Véronique Bruck: the state of crisis is a Pandora box that, once
opened, is difficult to close. Now that Luxembourg has solidly anchored this culture
in its Constitution, the Parliament and the judges need to remain alert and defend the
rule of law.
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